South Africa (SA) has pursued corporate governance reforms in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports. This paper examines the association between the presence of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) and market valuation of a sample of 169 firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in SA from 2002 to 2007. Our results suggest a statistically significant and positive relationship between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation. By contrast, we find no statistically significant association between the presence of non-executive directors (NEDs) and firm valuation. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity problems, non-linear associations and firm valuation proxies. Our findings have important policy and regulatory implications. Whereas our evidence that more independent corporate boards' impacts positively on firm valuation provides support for the recommendations of the King Reports, it shows that to be meaningful, director independence has to be more carefully and strictly defined.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the effect of the presence of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) on market valuation of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa (SA). Close to two decades of corporate governance (CG) reforms have been embarked on in SA, primarily in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports. A broader objective of the King Reports has been to raise CG standards in SA firms (Armstrong et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2011a) . A more specific aim of the reforms, however, has been to improve firm valuation by enhancing the independence and monitoring capacity of SA boards of directors (Kakabadse and Korac- Kakabadse, 2002; Ntim et al., 2011b) . A major proxy for corporate boards" independence and monitoring capacity is the proportion of outside directors (INEDs) (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) . In fact, the ongoing extensive public policy (Pfeffer, 1973; Fama, 1980; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) and academic (Baysinger and Butler, 1985 However, and whereas there is a theoretical agreement that INEDs perform crucial roles in improving corporate monitoring and valuation (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993; McDonald et al., 2008) , the empirical evidence on the effect of the presence of INEDs on firm valuation is mixed. A number of reasons, however, have been suggested that may account for the conflicting results of prior studies. Firstly, there is the issue of clearly defining who constitutes an INED, with most past studies simply classifying all outside directors as non-executive directors (NEDs) (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Weir and Laing, 2000) . However, some outside directors may have significant interests or connections with corporate executives (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Bozec, 2005; Gupta and Fields, 2009) , which can impair their independence, and thereby their ability to effectively advise, monitor and discipline management (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Jiraporn et al., 2009 ). This suggests that a much subtle and stricter definition of who is an INED has to be introduced if her/his independence and monitoring capacity is not to be compromised.
Secondly, past studies have been criticised for potential methodological deficiencies, with most of them mainly using ordinary least square regressions (OLS), in addition to not sufficiently accounting for endogeneity problems (El Mehdi, 2007; Kyereboah et al., 2006; Sunday, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010) , and thereby leading to spurious results. Thirdly, it has been argued that the association between INEDs and firm valuation may not just differ by company-level features, but also by differences in country-level CG and institutional characteristics (Ho and Apart from apparent conflicting findings and methodological weaknesses that have been highlighted, an additional problem with these studies is the excessive use of limited samples of firms [1] , and thereby making generalisation of findings difficult.
However, it is reasonable to argue that in developing economies with different CG practices and institutional settings (as will be further elaborated), the effectiveness of INEDs may vary, and therefore the relationship between INEDs and firm valuation can be expected to be different from what has been found in the more advanced economies. Thus, an investigation of the effect of the presence of INEDs on firm value in emerging African markets, where there is a severe absence of reliable empirical evidence will be crucial in offering a more complete insights on the impact of INEDs on firm valuation (Ho and Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008) .
Therefore, and in this paper, we examine the association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation for a sample of SA listed firms. The country offers an interesting setting to investigate the effect of Ntim et al., 2011a, b) . This can arguably have adverse implications on whether companies will voluntarily comply with and disclose CG rules, including those relating to the appointment of INEDs, and thereby potentially limiting the ability of a voluntary code to enhance CG standards by improving the independence and monitoring capacity of SA corporate boards. Our contention, therefore, is that the rich research setting in terms of variations with matured economies, the recent CG reforms pursued and the acute lack of prior evidence provides a strong justification to investigate the association between the presence of INEDs and market valuation of SA listed firms.
We contribute to the existing literature in many ways. Firstly, using a sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, we offer evidence on the association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation. As far as we are aware, it represents one of the first attempts at quantifying the effect of the presence of INEDs on corporate boards on firm valuation within an African setting, with specific regard to SA, and therefore critically extends the literature to that continent. It also contributes to the largely matured economies-based literature on the relationship between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. Secondly, and innovatively, we show that INEDs who meet a much stricter independence test positively influence firm valuation. Thirdly, we distinctively investigate the existence of potential non-linear relationship between INEDs and firm valuation. Fourthly, and different from most past studies, we rely on econometric techniques that adequately account for different types of endogeneity problems, including fixed-effects, as well as use different proxies of firm valuation.
Our findings suggest a statistically significant and positive association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation. In contrast, we find no statistically significant relationship between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. Our results are robust across a raft of econometric models that address different kinds of endogeneity problems and firm valuation proxies. Our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which indicates that greater independence reduces agency problems by improving the ability of corporate boards to effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives, and thereby enhancing market valuation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of the CG reforms contained in the King Reports, INEDs and the SA corporate setting. Section 3 reviews the prior theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of the presence of INEDs on firm valuation. Section 4 presents the research design. Section 5 reports empirical analyses, whereas section 6 contains concluding remarks.
The King reports, INEDs and the SA corporate setting
There is a consensus that the introduction of the King Reports explicitly institutionalised CG practices in SA (West, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011a Also, and unlike the Cadbury Report, which specified that at least two of the NEDs should be independent, King I did not clearly define who constitutes independent director or the number of independent NEDs (INEDs) that SA corporate boards should have (West, 2009; Ntim, 2009 
INEDs and firm valuation: theory, evidence and hypothesis development
A CG mechanism that the theoretical literature suggests can be used in reducing agency and information asymmetry problems in modern corporations is the appointment of INEDs (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) . However, there are two main contrasting views with respect to INEDs: those who are in favour of more INEDs on corporate boards and those who prefer more executive directors (Yermack, 1996; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003) . Those who support more INEDs on corporate boards usually base their arguments on a number of theories, including agency, resource independence, information asymmetry and reputation signaling (Pfeffer, 1973; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990 ; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009). Agency theory suggests that boards dominated by executive directors (insiders) are less accountable (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Sonnenfeld, 2002) . In contrast, INEDs possess a number of features. First, they bring independent judgment to board decisions (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Ntim, 2009) , which can impact positively on firm valuation. In particular, greater independence associated with INEDs grants them increased capacity to advise, monitor and discipline management to improve firm value by reducing managerial opportunism without fear or favour (Vafeas and Second, they provide their firms" with resources in the form of experience, expertise, business contacts and reputation (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) , which can enhance firm valuation. Third, the existence of competitive and efficient managerial labour markets both within and outside the firm ensures that INEDs inherently perform their monitoring function more effectively (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a) , and thereby improve firm value. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) argue that once top internal management gains control of a corporate board, they are more likely to connive and collude among themselves to engage in opportunistic activities, including expropriating shareholders" wealth. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the possibility of such internal managerial connivance might be reduced, and the viability of the board as a market-induced mechanism for low-cost transfer of control might be enhanced, by the addition of INEDs (Fama, 1980 , Fama, 1983a Gupta and Fields, 2009 ).
Finally, it has been argued that the appointment of INEDs helps in reducing information asymmetry by credibly signalling insiders" intent to treat outside or potential shareholders fairly, and by implication, guaranteeing the safety of their investment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009). It also signals to investors insiders" intent to rely on expert advice, as well as their appreciation of the importance of separating the decision-making and control functions (Fama, 1980 They report that, on average, the announcement of INED resignations result in 1.22% loss in a firm"s market value. This suggests that investors value board independence as independent boards are associated with greater monitoring of managerial behaviour (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b; Jensen, 1993) .
Of close importance to this study, Ho and Williams (2003) With specific reference to SA, the 1973 Companies Act requires every public company to appoint at least two INEDs. King II and the JSE Listings Rules also require SA corporate boards of directors to consist of a majority of NEDs. King II further requires that the majority of the NEDs be independent (INEDs) of management to ensure that minority interests are adequately protected. This suggests that King II expects that firms with more INEDs on their boards to be valued higher than those with less INEDs. As has been previously discussed, the past SA evidence (albeit it indirect) also indicates that a greater percentage of INEDs on corporate boards may be associated with higher firm valuation (Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) . However, given the mixed international evidence, we predict a statistically significant association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation without being specific about the direction of the sign. Therefore, the main hypothesis tested in this study is that:
There is either a statistically significant negative or positive relationship between the presence of NEDs or INEDs and firm valuation. 
Research design

Sample and data
Dependent, independent and control variables
This subsection discusses all the three main types of variables that we employ in our investigation, and Table 1 presents their full definitions. Firstly, we utilise two main independent variables for our regression analysis: the presence of NEDs and INEDs. Secondly, our main dependent variable or proxy for firm valuation is the widely used Tobin"s Q (Q). However, we use return on assets (ROA) and total share return (TSR) to check the sensitivity of our findings to alternative accounting and market-based firm value proxies, respectively. Finally, and similar to previous studies (Bozec, 2005 ; KyereboahColeman, 2007), we add below a number of control variables. First, firms with higher investment opportunities tend to grow faster (Henry 2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011) , and are more likely to be highly valued by the stock market. Thus, our expectation is that sales growth (GROWTH) will be positively associated with market valuation. Second, firms with greater investment in research and development can gain competitive advantages (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Gupta and Fields, 2009) , and therefore may be highly valued by the stock market.
In contrast, research and development is capital intensive activity (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000) , and thus, may have a negative influence on market valuation.
Table 1. Summary of variables
Firm valuation/dependent variables Q
The ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.
ROA
The percentage of operating profit to total assets.
TSR
The percentage of annualised total share returns made up of share price and dividends.
Corporate governance/independent variables NEDs
The percentage of all non-executive directors (all outside directors) to total number of directors on a corporate board.
INEDs
The percentage of NEDs who: are not representatives of a shareholder; have not been employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; are not members of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position in the past three financial years; are not professional advisors to the company; are not significant suppliers to or customers of the company; have no significant contractual relationship with the company; and are free from any business or other relationship which could be seen to materially interfere with the individual"s capacity to act in an independent manner.
Control variables BIG4
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.
CAPEX
The percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. CROSLIST A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. CGCOM A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise.
GEAR
The percentage of total debts to market value of equity. GOVOWN A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise.
GROWTH
The percentage of the current year"s sales minus last year"s sales to last year"s sales.
LNTA
The natural log of total assets.
INDUST
Industry dummies for the five main remaining industries. Similarly, higher debt usage can enhance firm value by effectively reducing managerial capacity to expropriate "free cash flows" (Jensen 1986; Jiraporn et al., 2009) . By contrast, higher use of debt can increase the risk of financial distress, and impact negatively on firm value by reducing the capacity of firms to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Ntim et al., 2011a) . Also, and due to greater agency problems, bigger firms can be expected to have good CG structures (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006) , and as such may be more highly valued by the stock market. On the other hand, smaller firms tend to have higher investment and growth opportunities (Weir et al., 2002; Guest, 2009 ), and thus, may receive higher market valuation. Due to the mixed theoretical predictions, we hypothesise that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and firm size (LNTA) will correlate either negatively or positively to firm value. Third, firms that are cross-listed on international stock markets are more likely to have greater access to funds and investment opportunities (Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011b) , and therefore may be valued more highly by the stock market. Thus, our prediction is that cross-listing (CROSLIST) will correlate positively to firm value. Fourth, it has been suggested that audit firm size is positively associated with auditor independence and audit quality (DeAngelo (1981; Ntim and Osei, 2011), and as such firms audited by large audit firms may have a positive association with firm value. Hence, our prediction is that audit firm size (BIG4) will correlate positively to firm value.
Fifth, as government ownership provides access to critical resources, such as finance and profitable government contracts ( variations, an indication that our sample has been adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation, and therefore avoids any possibilities of sample selection bias. Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin"s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. Return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total share returns made up of share price and dividends. Non-executive directors (NEDs), measured as the percentage of all non-executive directors (all outside directors) to total number of directors on a board. Independent NEDs (INEDs), is strictly defined as a NED who: are not representatives of a shareholder; have not been employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; are not members of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position in the past three financial years; are not professional advisors to the company; are not significant suppliers to or customers of the company; have no significant contractual relationship with the company; and are free from any business or other relationship which could be seen to materially interfere with the individual"s capacity to act in an independent manner. Audit firm size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPEX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. Crosslisting (CROSLIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm is cross-listed to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. The presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. Gearing (GEAR), calculated as the ratio of total debts to market value of equity. Government ownership (GOVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise. Sales growth (GROWTH), calculated as the current year"s sales minus last year"s sales to last year"s sales. Firm size (LNTA), measured as the natural log of total assets.
Empirical analyses
Descriptive statistics
We also tested linear regression assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. We tested the multicollinearity assumption by implementing the Spearman non-parametric and Pearson parametric bivariate correlation tests among the variables. The findings, which to save space are not reported, but available on request, indicated that no serious nonnormalities and multicollinearities existed among the variables. Additionally, we investigated scatter, P-P and Q-Q plots, studentised residuals, Cook"s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics of the variables, and the tests also suggested no significant breach of the linear regression assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and autocorrelation, indicating that it is appropriate to conduct multivariable regression analyses.
Multivariate regression analyses
Firms tend to vary in the threats and opportunities that they face over time (Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2011b) . This can result in scenario whereby NEDs or INEDs and Q are jointly and dynamically influenced by firmspecific variations, such as corporate culture, complexity and executive talent (Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2009) , which simple OLS regressions may be unable to detect (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003) , and thereby leading to spurious findings (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006) . Therefore, given the panel nature of our data, as well as following previous studies (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2011b) , we conduct fixed-effects regressions [5] in order to account for possible unobserved firm-specific heterogeneities. We begin our analysis with basic fixed-effects regression specified as follows:
where: Q is the main dependent variable, INEDs/NEDs are the main independent variables, CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including BIG4, CAPEX, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GEAR, GOVOWN, GROWTH, INDUST and YD, and δ refers to the firm-level fixed-effects, made up of a vector of 168 year dummies to represent the 169 sampled firms. Table 3 presents fixed-effects regressions results of the effect of the presence of NEDs or INEDs on Q. First, to ascertain whether the presence of NEDs influences Q, we run Q on the NEDs alone excluding the control variables using equation (1) . Statistically insignificant and positive impact of NEDs on Q is noticeable in Model 1 of Table 3 . However, the coefficient on the constant term in Model 1 of Table 3 is statistically significant and appears to indicate that the model may be suffering from omitted variables bias. Therefore, to check whether our finding is not spuriously caused by omitted variables bias, we include the control variables in Model 2 to account for potential omitted variables bias. Again, positive, but statistically insignificant effect of NEDs on Q is clearly observable in Model 2 of Table 3 , and thereby failing to provide support for H 1, but consistent with the findings of prior studies that report insignificant association between NEDs and firm valuation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir and Laing, 2000) . A possible explanation is that some NEDs tend to have significant interests or close connections with corporate management (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Gupta and Fields, 2009 ). This can impede their independence, and consequently their capacity to effectively monitor and discipline executives (Jensen, 1993; Jiraporn et al., 2009) . Table 3 . Fixed-effects regressions of the effect of independent non-executive directors on firm valuation
Adjusted R Second, and given our evidence of statistically insignificant effect of the presence of NEDs on Q, we re-run equation (1) Table 3 . However, the coefficient on the constant term is statistically significant, indicating that there may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, to ascertain whether our evidence is not falsely driven by omitted variables bias, we re-estimate Model 3 by adding the control variables. The coefficient of INEDs on Q in Model 4 of Table 3 is statistically significant and positive, and thereby providing support for H 1 , as well as the recommendations of King II [6] . Our evidence also provides support for the results of past studies (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Kyereboah-Coleman et al., 2006; Gupta and Fields, 2009 ) that report a positive association between INEDs and firm valuation, but inconsistent with those that report a negative (Yermack, 1996; Laing and Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007) . Theoretically, our results are in line with agency theoretical predictions, which suggest that more independent corporate boards have greater capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives (Fama, 1980; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) , and thereby enhancing firm value.
Control variables BIG4
Finally, and the coefficients on the control variables in Models 2 and 4 of Table 3 are generally consistent with our predictions. For example and as expected, the coefficients on CAPEX, GEAR and LNTA are statistically significant and negatively associated with Q, whilst BIG4, CGCOM, CROSLIST, GOVOWN and GROWTH are statistically significant and positively related to Q, in Models 2 and 4. Finally, the F-values in Models 2 to 4 of Table 3 consistently reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the main independent and the control variables are equal to zero. In line with the findings of past studies (Yermack, 1996; Bozec, 2005; Gupta and Fields, 2009 ), the adjusted R 2 is between 3% and 35%, suggesting that our fixed-effects estimations can explain significant variations in our sampled firms" Q.
Sensitivity analyses
Our fixed-effects estimations so far do not take into consideration the existence of possible non-linear relationships and alternative firm valuation proxies, as well as other potential endogeneity problems. This suggests that the evidence of a significant positive association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation, for example, may be spurious. In this subsection, we examine how sensitive our results are to the presence of non-monotonic associations, alternative firm value measures and other endogeneities.
First, to investigate whether there is a non-linear association between INEDs and firm value, such that either the presence of a small or large number of INEDs has a positive effect on Q, as predicted by Jensen (1993) , we re-estimate equation (1) [7] . Positive, but statistically insignificant effect of INEDs 2 on Q is observable in Model 5 of Table 3 , and thereby suggesting that our evidence of a positive impact of the presence of INEDs on Q is robust to this specification. Second and as previously explained, we examine the sensitivity of our results to two alternative firm valuation proxies: return on assets (ROA -an accounting based proxy) and total share returns (TSR -a market based measure). Models 6 and 7 of Table 3 present findings obtained by using ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically significant and positive effect of INEDs on ROA and TSR in models 6 and 7 of Table 3 , respectively, is noticeable, and thereby suggesting that our findings are insensitive to the use of either an accounting (ROA) or a market (TSR) based firm valuation proxy, instead of Q.
Third, to address potential extra endogeneity problems that may be caused by omitted variable bias, we implement the extensively used two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) . However, to ensure that the 2SLS methodology appropriate, and following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) (1), the test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and as such we conclude that the 2SLS technique may be appropriate and that our earlier findings based on the fixed-effects estimations may be spurious. In the first stage, we assume that INEDs will be influenced by the ten control variables (i.e., as exogenous variables) specified in equation (1) . In the second stage, we utilise the predicted portion of the INEDs (PRE_INEDs) as an instrument for the INEDs and re-run equation (1) as specified below:
whereby everything remains the same as specified in equation (1) [8] except that we employ the predicted INEDs (PRE_INEDs) from the first-stage regression as an instrument for the INEDs. Statistically significant and positive effect of the PRE_INEDs on Q is clearly noticeably in Model 8 of Table 3 , and thereby indicating that our evidence of a positive effect of INEDs on Q is not sensitive to endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential omitted variables. Overall, the sensitivity analyses suggest that our findings are fairly insensitive to different types of potential endogeneity problems, non-monotonic relationships and alternative firm valuation measures.
Summary and conclusion
This paper has attempted to examine the association between the presence of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) and firm valuation using a sample of 169 firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) from 2002 to 2007 in South Africa (SA). This coincides with a period during which the SA authorities embarked upon corporate governance (CG) reforms that mainly focused on raising CG standards in SA firms by enhancing the independence and monitoring capacity of corporate boards, primarily in the shape of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports.
Our findings suggest a positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. In contrast, we find statistically significant and positive association between the presence of INEDs and firm valuation. Additionally, we examine the existence of potential non-linear relationship between NEDs or INEDs and firm valuation, whereby either a relatively small or large number of NEDs or INEDs positively influences firm valuation as suggested by Jensen (1993), but we do not find any such statistically significant nonmonotonic links. Our findings are consistent across a raft of econometric models that take into consideration different types of endogeneity problems and firm valuation proxies. Overall, our results provide empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that more independent corporate boards tend to have increased capacity to effectively advise, monitor and discipline corporate executives, and thereby enhancing firm valuation.
Our evidence also has important implications for policy-makers and regulatory authorities. Whilst our evidence that more independent corporate boards" impacts positively on firm valuation provides support for the recommendations of the King Reports, it suggests that to be useful, director independence has to be more subtly and strictly defined. Further, and given that SA firms are far from having a majority of their board members being INEDs as recommended by the 2002 King Report, there is the need to strengthen compliance and enforcement. In this respect, establishing a "compliance and enforcement committee" to regularly check the levels of compliance among listed firms may help in improving CG standards. (1) is not a representative of a shareholder; (2) has not been employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; (3) is not a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position in the past three financial years; (4) is not a professional advisor to the company; (5) is not a significant supplier to or customer of the company; (6) has no significant contractual relationship with the company; and (7) industries, namely health care, oil and gas, and telecoms industries with three, one and three listed companies, respectively, were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. Consequently, the three health care companies were included in the consumer services industry, the one oil and gas firm was added to the basic materials industry, whilst the three telecoms firms were also shared out to the technology industry.
5. However, we note that our choice is between random and fixed-effects estimation techniques. Therefore, to ensure that fixed-effects model is appropriate, we first conduct Hausman (1978) specification test by estimating both fixed and random-effects models for the NEDs or INEDs separately using equation (1) and comparing their respective coefficients. Under the null hypothesis of consistent random unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (i.e., unobserved firmspecific effects or the regressions errors are uncorrelated with the independent variables), random-effects estimates will be both consistent and efficient, whilst fixed-effects coefficients will be consistent, but inefficient (Hausman, 1978; Woodridge, 2002) . In contrast, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then the fixed-effects approach will provide both consistent and efficient estimates, whereas random-effects estimates will be both inconsistent and biased (Hausman, 1978; Gujarati, 2003) . The test consistently rejects the null hypothesis of consistent random effects for both models at the 1% level, providing further empirical support for our decision to rely primarily on fixed-effects models. 6. As NEDs are statistically insignificant in our models, all our subsequent estimations and discussions will be based on INEDs, instead NEDs. 7. We conducted similar non-linear investigation for the NEDs proxy and found statistically insignificant non-monotonic link between the presence of NEDs and firm valuation. We also explored other forms of non-monotonic transformations, such as cubing the variables (i.e., NEDs or INEDs), but we found statistically insignificant association between the presence of NEDs or INEDs and firm valuation. 8. As estimating a lagged structure will invalidate the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002; Gujarati, 2003) , we estimate equation (2) as un-lagged structure. An additional advantage is that it allows us to ascertain the robustness of our results against estimating an un-lagged structure.
